CBDR : Seminar Series : Seminar by Daniel Oppenheimer
| Voting Agent Model of Preferences: A Computational Model of Individual Multiattribute Choice |
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presented by Daniel Oppenheimer (Princeton University) |
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Thursday, September 4 |
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12pm |
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Porter 223D |
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link to Speaker's Site |
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Abstract: |
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This paper examines the extent to which decision anomalies can be explained as an emergent property of aggregation of preferences. We assume multiple neurons or neural systems (agents) within an individual, each with different goals and preferences. We show that several puzzling decision anomalies (attraction effects, similarity effects, and compromise effects) arise as a natural consequence of aggregating these preferences. As a result "irrational" behavior at the level of the individual can possibly be explained by the summation of "rational" preferences at the neural level.
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