Center for Behavioral Decision Research

CBDR : Seminar Series : Seminar by Daniel Bartels

The flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

	presented by Daniel Bartels (University of Chicago)


	Tuesday, December 2	link to paper
	12pm
	Porter 223D	link to Speaker's Site

	Abstract:

	People usually make choices to obtain desired outcomes. However, choices in the moral domain are sometimes driven more by ideas about how sacred entities are to be treated (“do not allow companies to pollute the earth for a fee...”) than by the consequences associated with the action (“even if pollution credits reduce pollution”). One interpretation of such seemingly paradoxical preferences is that moral values motivate rigid rule-based decision processes that ignore outcomes. However, the studies I will present suggest that both actions and outcomes matter, and that decisions depend on (1) the moral relevance ascribed to choices (low vs. high), (2) evaluative focus (on moral rules vs. consequences), and (3) processing style (intuitive vs. deliberative). The results demonstrate that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition: when violations of moral proscriptions are egregious, they generate affective reactions that overwhelm consideration of the consequences favoring their violation; however, when attention is directed to the positive consequences of such actions, people ignore these proscriptions. These studies suggest that moral cognition is more flexible than previously assumed and develop a framework in which to examine the relationship between emotional reactions to moral violations and consideration of consequences in moral decisions.

	Host at CMU: Morewedge