Center for Behavioral Decision Research

CBDR : Seminar Series : Seminar by John Kagel

Team Play, Advice and Context in Signaling Games

	presented by John Kagel (Ohio State University)


	Thursday, May 8	link to paper
	Noon-1:15
	Porter 223D	link to Speaker's Site

	Abstract:

	We report a series of experiments dealing with how subjects learn to play strategically in signaling games. Interactive, two-person, teams consistently play more strategically than individuals, and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding “truth wins” norm. Non-interactive two-person teams, in which one player gives advice to a silent partner, have essentially the same level of strategic play as teams do. Meaningful context can promotes positive cross-game learning for individuals, but changes in context can result in negative cross-game learning for individuals. In contrast, changes in context have no effect on team play. We relate the superior ability of teams to beat the truth wins norm in our setting to the typical failure to beat it in psychology experiments to fundamental differences in experimental design.

	Host at CMU: Weber